(or the ultimate dialectic against theism) by Jersey Flight
Theism has a particular way. In every case it bears the burden of proof. Theism is something that attempts to disrupt life. This disruption is important to the dialectic against theism.
How does theism begin? It begins the same way. [Only those who are desperate seek out the platitudes of theism, hoping to find security in its mask of authority.] Theism approaches life; it seeks to strangle life by the vicissitudes of dogma, that is, to complicate life by confusing it with theology.
The dialectic of theism runs thus:
Breaking in on life, the theist has no choice but to ask the question we have never felt the need to ask ourselves: "Do you believe in God?"
This is the question which accounts for the beginning of the dialectic of theism, as well as the end of the dialectic of theism. With this question theism seeks to disrupt life.
And the reason theism must ask this question, is because no healthy man or woman would seek to complicate life with such a tedious and unnecessary ontology. The man who lives finds no place for God! God is the antithesis of life! [These are the conclusions of a healthy mind.]
It is precisely at the point, of this unnecessary question, that we have the power to destroy theism. [There is no need to directly interact with the question.] As we said, in every case theism bears the burden of proof. Thus we reply:
'Can you justify the act of pursuing this question? Why should I use my time to consider this?'
If the theist cannot answer this question, without resorting to special pleading, then we will have legitimately surmounted the dialectic of theism without having to directly engage the dialectic of theism. The theist bears the burden of proof, and if he cannot substantiate his claim, above that of every other arbitrary, wild claim... until the theist can justify (or warrant) a conversation on something as tedious and unnecessary as God, there is no reason to waste our time on his semantics. (Nothing could be more impractical to life than the question of God)!
The point is that we are already engaged in the act of living life when this question tries to break in on life. What this means is that we have no need of God. In this sense the question of God functions like a kind of red herring... it is literally something that pulls us away from life.
The argument that will be made by the theist, to counter the proficiency of our dialectic, is that we are somehow defective without a knowledge of God. The theist will try to instill a kind of subtle despair or insecurity. But how can his line of reasoning proceed when we are successful at life? Do we need God to be moral? (Keep in mind every notion of God is specific). Do we need God in order to obtain the necessities of life? When the theist fails to infect life with insecurity he will turn to the desperate tactic of eternity. He will claim that life goes on forever and that we need God for the advent of eternity. But again, in every case the theist bears the burden of proof. Now we are no longer having a conversation about God, now the question has to do with eternity and all the semantics that accompany eternity. [Even if the theist was a master, at this mysterious and abstract dialectic, the chances of him being able to fuse his idea of God, with his defense of eternity, is nearly impossible. Once again, he turns to despair.]
After we ask the question, of the relevance of the question of God, there are not many places the theist can turn. The reason for this is because our question, not only has its origin in life, but is directed back at life. The same cannot be said for theism: theism is directed away from life! What the theist ultimately seeks to do is subject life to an ideology which has nothing to do with life, in essence, the theist seeks to dominate life with his abstract ontology. This provides him with the delusion (sense of power) that he can control and explain life.
If the theist can get us to play his sophistical game, then in a very real sense, he has already won the exchange. The very fact that we are taking the time to probe something as abstract and arbitrary as God, proves that we are presupposing the importance of the question of God. But why should we assume that this question is important? This is the theist's burden to bear because it is the question he must ask as a proponent of theism, if he would put forth the relevance of theism, as he would seek to assault life with theism. And if he cannot justify the act of his sophistry, then we have every right to ignore his question. There are many questions in life, but none of them are as unnecessary and disruptive as that of theism.
I suspect the majority of this dialectic will prove to be too advanced for the common theist. In their minds this is the most important question a man could ever ask, but what they don't see is their special pleading. Anyone can make this claim, about any particular ontology, unicorns or smurfs, and thereby draw us into their web of sophistry. But life is too short to proceed this way! Let the theist first justify the act of pursuing this question, and then, and only then, will we proceed. (Keep in mind that this is only the beginning of the theist's problems; should he manage to warrant this question as a legitimate question of life, he would then be met with an onslaught of legitimate resistance). It is not our responsibility to warrant this question for the theist, and we are fools if we assume its validity.
My hope, is that in the future, I will have the chance to display the power of this dialectic in action.