Saturday, June 29, 2013

A LETTER ON ACADEMIC PHILOSOPHY-- Jersey Flight

Academic philosophy... what is the value of academic philosophy? I did hear that such papers are good for wiping one's bottom. Of course, in a sense all philosophy is academic (and) all philosophy is popular. Now as to this idea of public/ and private/ academic, doctrinaire language--- is this of great value? The problem is not that too many philosophers are playing games, but that too many philosophers are playing games which are entirely unnecessary, totally disconnected. What after all is the grand-point? It seems the academic philosopher feels himself superior for having comprehended a sophisticated equation (although the hilarity of the thing is that the equation itself is rather redundant), (more like an eccentric side-issue, or a fit of mathematical passion)... where are the philosophers with the courage to speak from the earth? Not more games, but to proceed as though one's very existence were at stake? We have become too separate from the question!

It is all to easy to discourse on pain while one is in good health, but I want the philosopher who has been sick a long time and desperately seeks a cure! A man who needs the answer as much as he is driven to ask the question! For this is my idea of a philosopher as he that speaks from the earth.

Saturday, June 22, 2013

THE MIGHTY THEISM OF RICHARD SWINBURNE-- Jersey Flight

“It is not possible to treat a teleological argument in complete isolation from the cosmological argument. We cannot ask how probable the premiss of the teleological argument makes theism, independently of the premiss of the cosmological argument, for the premiss of the teleological argument entails in part the premiss of the cosmological argument.” Richard Swinburne, The Argument From Design, Philosophy of Religion, Third Edition pg.64-65, edited by Louis P. Pojman, Wadsworth Publishing 1998.

But we must go further. At the heart of every theistic proposition lies the axiom of the ontological argument (there is simply no way to get around it). God is a concept which must be defined, and it is the ontological argument, more than any other argument, which seeks to make him a reality; which seeks to state something specific about his being.

Of all the arguments this is the most ridiculous argument: for in seeking to say something specific about God it ends up producing more vagary about God--- and we are left at precisely the place we started.

What is the use of any argument if the entity in question has not been defined?

What can a man like Swinburne (oh the mighty Swinburne!) know about God? The answer is absolutely nothing! Every argument for the existence of God (has not the ontology of God as its object of knowing) but the ontology of the Universe... supposedly man obtains a better understanding of the Universe? [Hence, it is ordered; hence it was created; hence it stands a moral universe.] But these arguments tell us nothing about God, and even further, they tell us nothing about the Universe! The attributes are superimposed, interjected from without... they were the beliefs one brought to the syllogism and not the conclusions that one drew from the syllogism!   

A CHALLENGE TO THEISTIC PHILOSOPHERS:
--------Prove you know there is one God as opposed to many Gods--------

Swinburne says monotheism “is a simpler explanation.” But is it simpler than the notion of Naturalism (the Universe explained by the Universe)? Disease is explained by science; why must we still invoke the image of the Demon; why must we still posit the idea of a God!

[C. S. Lewis in rejecting Naturalism claimed it was too simple; he wanted to bring some magic into his world; the straightforwardness of nature was too much for him to bear--- Lewis’ solution was the affirmation of the Neo-Hebrew-God, or what should otherwise, in more intelligent circles, be called delusion.] Surprised by Joy Chapter 7.

As to the idea of many Gods Swinburne plays the following game: “we want to ask about it such questions as why are there just 333 deities (or whatever the number is), why do they have powers of just the strength which they do have, and what moves them to cooperate as closely as obviously they do; questions of this kind which obtrude far less with far simpler and so less arbitrary theistic hypothesis.” Ibid. pg.63

The craftiness here; the sheer arrogant, ivory-tower snobbishness, the elitism, the intentional dialectic pretension, the superficial contrast, but most of all the lack of honesty (this is the worst that Oxford has ever produced)!

What provoked the idea of many Gods in the first place? Was it not the insistence of the theist toward the conclusion of his monotheism? Was it not the level of authority with which he put forth his thesis; a kind of fascistic objectivity; the attitude of logical certainty; condescension from the delusion of intellectual superiority? And the mighty Swinburne wants to ask specific questions about polytheism (as though such questions work in favor of his thesis)? I tell you my friends this is all high-brow-subterfuge to evade the inevitable defeat of his theism. And yet Swinburne fails to see that the same complexity; the same infinity of questions lie in wait for his monotheism!

[Is not Swinburne the maddest and most desperate of all Christians? Or will he join us in lambasting the stupidity of the Christian God, that impossible concept of Trinity? Has man ever devised a more absurd fairytale? And yet Swinburne claims a two thousand year old apocalyptic, self-proclaimed Hebrew prophet is God! (We refer of course to the mythological Christ, that fantastic high-born-image of the gospels, which must always be distinguished from the conversation of the historical Christ). But what relation does his theism have to Christianity? (or to use his own logic): is the Trinity a simpler explanation than deism? Is he not the maddest of all Christians--- is he not the most confused theist? Has he truly evaded the charge of arguing from authority? To get at his Christ one must assume the authority of the document; one must presume the infallibility of certain statements; one must harmonize; one must piece together; one must draw a plurality of subjective inferences--- behold the theologian’s madness; behold his repetitious sickness! If the document states (p), which thing is declared (p) on the basis of subjective inference, then the argument is of course, that (p) must be true---- because it is the claim of the document and the document is the claim of God! I say this (and not something philosophical as Swinburne would have us believe) lies at the very heart of his theism! The concept of Christ as God is not a deduction from nature, but a presumption of theology based on a preferred set of varied documents, infused with the presupposition of absolute authority. This is the first premise of Swinburne’s reasoning and not something else!] 

the hypothesis of theism [meaning monotheism]... has greater explanatory power than the [polytheistic alternative]... and is for that reason more probable. For theism leads us to expect that we will find throughout nature one pattern of order. But if there were more than one deity responsible for the order of the universe, we would expect to see characteristic marks of the handiwork of different deities in different parts of the universe, just as we see different kinds of workmanship in different houses of a city.Ibid. pg.63

But what has a tiger to do with a fish? What has a tree to do with a river? What has Earth to do with Mars? Why are these not the characteristic marks, the varied workmanship of varied individuals? 
               
Above all else what does Swinburne’s pontification produce?  
Ans: the solid conclusion that he actually knows nothing about God!!!

Whether God is one or many Swinburne has no way to tell, and until he can get at the specific nature of his deity, there is no conversation--- God is not a rational conclusion; he is not even part of the conversation!

Long before the teleological argument; long before the cosmological argument man must suffer under the burden of the ontological argument--- but this burden is not for those who resist, but for those who seek to go beyond nature as a means by which to explain nature; for those who are bold enough to posit the idea of God. (The deity they put forth has a nature; the question is whether or not they can actually know this nature)?

Suppose we find order, why could the Gods not exist in antithesis to this order (for are they not said to exist in antithesis to evil)? For here man only selects the attributes of his liking, and yet he admits that things exist in opposition to God--- so why can’t order be the antithesis of God?

“...I suggest that the order of the world is evidence of the existence of God both because its occurrence would be very improbable a priori and also because, in virtue of his postulated character, he has very good, apparently overriding, reason for making an orderly universe, if he makes a universe at all.” Ibid. pg 66-67

His postulated character? HIS POSTULATED CHARACTER! Again this only serves as further proof that Swinburne can know nothing about God! Since when did God become reasonable (perhaps reason exists in antithesis to God)? As it would seem, Swinburne uses the analogy of man to formulate his concept of God. But how can such an analogy tell us anything about God if God is said to be transcendent? Behold the circle of philosophical theism: ALL WE KNOW OF GOD WE KNOW BY WAY OF POSTULATION! It seems knowledge of God requires the omniscience of God: for in what points does he correspond to the universe and at what points does he transcend the universe? How can we know the proper analogy for God unless we first know God; and how can we know God unless we first know the proper analogy... unless God can be known by some other means than analogy? [The latter is the bane of natural theology in that analogy enforces restrictive ontological limitations which are catastrophic to the possibility of knowing God ... as per the idea of God it would seem analogy is not enough?] All of this requires the highest level of omniscience; man must essentially know the particulars of God in order to explain God by analogy. But as to whether or not God can be explained by analogy... (this only serves as further proof that God cannot be explained at all)! Why is man the right analogy to deduce the reasonableness of God?

“The teleologist’s starting-point is not that we perceived order rather than disorder, but that order rather than disorder is there.” Ibid. pg.62

Very well then, perhaps it is there in antithesis to God? For is this not what men claim about evil? This game goes on and on into infinity precisely because man can know nothing about God---- precisely---- because the very notion of God is antiquated fiction---- or that which amounts to the same---- something unreachable!

“... as I emphasized, human inquiry into divine reasons is a highly speculative matter.” Ibid. pg.66

No my friends, this is not merely speculative; not simply a matter of high speculation, but a notion which seems impossible! Who has solved this infinite equation; for one must first know the particular nature of God?

Contrary to Swinburne; human reason is the only kind of inquiry there is! This exemplifies the problem with theism; Swinburne speaks as though there were another: in positing theism one posits that there is always something other than what there is.

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“Why not assert the deity or deities to be corporeal, and, to have eyes, a nose, mouth, ears, etc.? The answer is the simple one that dissimilarities between effects lead the rational man to postulate dissimilarities between causes, and this procedure is basic to inductive inference.” Ibid. pg.68

Even if we affirm the attribute of dissimilarity does this logically lead to the conclusion of a transcendent God (without eyes; without ears), or in Swinburne’s case---- to the Trinity?!!! [At this point if one does not sense the ridiculousness of Swinburne’s maneuvering (which is nothing more than the fallacy of non-sequitur) it is probably safe to say they never will.]  

In every instance of the analogy the effects and causes are physical; the dissimilarities are physical! The notion of dissimilarity in no way produces the conclusion of transcendent cause and effect. A statue created by Michelangelo is physical, even as Michelangelo, as the cause, is physical. The dissimilarity between Michelangelo and his statue in no way produces the conclusion of a monotheistic, transcendent deity (dissimilarity does not equal a mono-transcendent-being)! If anything the analogy only serves as further proof that one can know nothing as to the nature of the cause if dissimilarities between effects lead to the conclusion of dissimilarities between causes. (In this instance is not polytheism far more rational)? To state the thesis again, what can Swinburne truly know about God? If anything, the analogy of dissimilarity commits him to the idea of a physical cause! And this, in the context of Swinburne’s desired deity, is catastrophic!

[Can one even believe we have taken the time to expose this nonsense?--------- THE TRINITY???!!!--------- One might as well expend valuable energy refuting the idea of the boogeyman. This is a game for children not philosophers!]   

Thursday, June 20, 2013

THOMAS HUXLEY ON AGNOSTICISM

Agnosticism, in fact, is not a creed, but a method, the essence of which lies in the rigorous application of a single principle. That principle is of great antiquity; it is as old as Socrates; as old as the writer who said, "Try all things, hold fast by that which is good"; it is the foundation of the Reformation, which simply illustrated the axiom that every man should be able to give a reason for the faith that is in him; it is the great principle of Descartes; it is the fundamental axiom of modern science. Positively the principle may be expressed: In matters of the intellect, follow your reason as far as it will take you, without regard to any other consideration. And negatively: In matters of the intellect do not pretend that conclusions are certain which are not demonstrated or demonstrable. That I take to be the agnostic faith, which if a man keep whole and undefiled, he shall not be ashamed to look the universe in the face, whatever the future may have in store for him.

Wednesday, June 19, 2013

MY DEBATE WITH DR. HOPPNER-- Jersey Flight

In my debate with Dr. Hoppner I replied: 

Not all things are necessary. It is indeed necessary for me to open the door if I purpose to leave the debate, but it is in no way necessary for me to believe in God in order to open the door. In this way my friend, God is of very little value to my life. For in what way can he be said to be necessary to my opening the door? And surely this is only a small analogy to exemplify the fact, that even if he does exist, he has no value to my existence--- for "I" must open the door, "I" must go through it... if experience has taught me anything it has taught me that he who waits for God to open the door is a fool! It is perhaps the highest discovery to realize that the concept of God is in no way necessary to the life of man.




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Tuesday, June 18, 2013

WEAKNESS IN FAVOR OF THEISM-- Jersey Flight

What happens if a theist fights back (not if he should win the affirmation of his eccentricities) but simply if he fights back? In this respect the psychology of man is weak--- we are all too quick to claim victory; we are all too quick to claim defeat.

Theism died out in accord with the advance of Logical Positivism, and in our time, it has been rejuvenated, resurrected by the semantics of Linguistic Philosophy, analytical dialectics! Is this not obscene? Theism merely offers an equation and the world claims it has been resurrected! There is no examination of the details... one merely takes note of the fact that the syllogism seems (appears by every conceivable account of the surface) complicated; one merely takes note of the fact that it exists! But truth be known; men are stupid! We see a marvelous looking equation; we see the magician fight back to the tune that his magic is real (which is really nothing more than a show of confidence) and by this the world proclaims him a champion! Theism is suddenly considered a contender? But on what grounds? 
  
Theism is not really making progress, but what it is doing is dabbling in the power of appearance. What is theism after all if not the longest line of rhetoric ever presented to man--- to ever assault man! And men are weak; we feel pity for theism, and as such, we search desperately to affirm the claims of theism (we are hoping to find a reason to give theism the benefit of the doubt). Theism is after all, a healthy moral system--- isn’t this the most ingenious insinuation toward the sentimental reign of theism? “But we need it.” “It poses no threat.” Or in the worse case---- it is good for man! We feel sorry for theism! But why, when it has so subtly robbed us of life? No man lives in line with his theism--- existence is not theistic! Show me a theistic man and I will show you an agitated Naturalist!

The weakness in favor of theism is the weakness of a mind taken in by appearance. We praise theistic philosophers? [Again, this is only because of appearance.] Theism has made a great show; but the time of appearance is over in that we have discovered the secret of theism in the appearance of theism--- by god we must tell men that the solidity of theism is only an appearance!!! Those who praise the appearance have been mastered by those who create the appearance... But greater men are interested in the substance; what stands behind all this fancy theater, behind these disjointed and disconnected lines? Men have been bold and serious; they have been outright passionate, and because we are weak we have taken this bold-seriousness, this outlandish-passion, as evidence that theistic belief is true. Theism is true because the proponent of theism is serious; because he proclaims the death of meaning in its absence--- and if this fails--- theism is true because it puts forth the appearance of solidity! Indeed, how can it be denied; for these two reasons alone theism must not only be true, but irrefutable as well! [One could never speak more bitingly.] The man who still believes in the power of theism manifests that he is left over from an earlier time; the way he thinks is tragically outdated. It is not that the New Man is coming, but that he is already here!

Friday, June 14, 2013

THEISM IN CONTEXT-- Jersey Flight

What is left of theism? Is theism a thriving force in the world? Has it not had to pacify itself in light of the motion of the earth; in light of the progress of reason and science? Surely this is to speak plainly? In how many ways has theism been humbled?  

Today's theist is holding on by a thread; he fails to understand his future; he cannot discern where his logic leads:

“What I claim for this argument [the ontological argument]... is that it establishes, not the truth of theism, but its rational acceptability.” Plantinga, The Ontological Argument, in Philosophy of Religion, edited by Louis P. Pojman, third edition pg.88

Since when has theism denied truth? Is this favorable to its claim of morality? By rational acceptability Plantinga means, rational for all those who accept the premise that the existence of a maximally great being is possible. But we have a better question: is it possible to establish the truth of theism at all? And what of the nature of this so-called rationality?

...rational for all those who accept the premise that the existence of a maximally great being is possible. Ibid.
This amounts to affirming assumptions, confirmation bias in the most particular direction. Theism can no longer distinguish as it would like; it is now forced to settle for the most generalized and vague concepts of deity in that it cannot defend specific deity. Theism has thrown up its hands in exhaustion... there is no good reason why the modern theist should choose Polytheism over Monotheism, Christianity over Islam. In this sense the nature of theism is that of personal preference (in modern theism subjectivity reigns supreme)! No ground has been obtained. Theistic philosophy is a linguistic smoke-screen; the most desperate of all theological games!

Is there truly any value left in the discourse of theism?

Let us hear the question again: what is the value of vague theism (seeing the value of theism has always been attached to specifics)?  

What is left of theism beyond the pretense of the game? Only more make believe; and mankind has grown tired of pretending that the Good Wizard lives behind the old tree. Life goes on in the total absence of his wizardry... and the most reasonable answer... is because there is no Wizard behind the tree!  


Monday, June 10, 2013

AUGUSTINE AND THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION- Jersey Flight

…every one who boasts that he, through divine illumination, understands the obscurities of Scripture, though not instructed in any rules of interpretation, at the same time believes, and rightly believes, that this power is not his own, in the sense of originating with himself, but is the gift of God. For so he seeks God's glory, not his own. But reading and understanding, as he does, without the aid of any human interpreter, why does he himself undertake to interpret for others? Why does he not rather send them direct to God, that they too may learn by the inward teaching of the Spirit without the help of man?” Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, from Preface paragraph 8.

The fact that one should ever have to deal with such an objection is absurd (not to mention Augustine’s own philosophy is absurd, being as it is, a form of irrational mysticism). The idea of "the power which is not our own” (and yet really is our own) is a way of creating authority for one’s view; a way of establishing a special case for one’s “God-given interpretation of reality" (above all non God-given interpretations of reality). Behold the context of true blasphemy!

But Augustine does produce one important observation: a hermeneutics of mysticism and intuition falls flat in that it would mean the justification of all mysticism and all intuition. Hence, “…why does he undertake to interpret for others? Why does he not rather send them direct to God?” Answer: because it would deprive him, the theologian, of his [presumed] exclusive authority. The final clause reads: “only my experience and interpretation of God (and his revelation) can be true!”

The act of theological interpretation is not a matter of truth (not a desire for truth!), but a matter of propositional power (a desire to rid one’s self of one’s positional insignificance), and in most cases, this comes in the form of puritanical, archaic moralism. [We use the word "weak," following Nietzsche, to reference those who seek power by means of theological proposition.]

Down with those who blaspheme against the utility of reason in order to declare the supremacy of their mysticism!

Saturday, June 8, 2013

THE ONTOLOGY OF THEISM- Jersey Flight

In most cases, the theist, unless he has a higher education (and even here one is often the victim of subtleties) resorts to the fallacy of "Poisoning the Well." Isn't this the universal complaint against non-theists: that we are immoral, impious reprobates?

This is a form of abuse in the name of God, on the basis of groundless suppositions. In order for such a charge to function with authority it must be able to establish some form of credibility. But on what basis can such a charge be founded? One is in need of authority and yet one is condemned by an ontology of metaphysical futility.

The transcendental reality, of those who commit the fallacy of "Poisoning the Well" (among other fallacies), is that they cannot deal with the argument. Hence, the existence of the fallacy is proof of the incompetence of their belief.

So, in relation to theism, the existence of fallacies proves something; not that the antithesis should be condemned on the basis of an irrelevant and unsustainable defect (namely lack of piety), but that theism cannot legitimately participate in the conversation. The standard of reason (of intelligent deduction from evidence) is simply too high for the religious person to maintain. There is a total absence of rational ability due to the dilapidated ontology of theistic belief. What theism is, is also the reason for its inability toward reason.

Case and point: the ontology of theism guarantees the existence and necessity of fallacy in the face of reason. To be a theist is to be committed to an epistemology of justification on the basis of fallacy. 




CORRESPONDENCE ON THESIS


I.

Atheist: "A bright moral line between theists and non-theists might make you feel good, but you haven't indicated its location."

More than indication: one introduces the term G-O-D (which is empty until proven substantive).

Long before any kind of theism one presupposes the authority of Naturalism. Hence, the idea of G-O-D is informed by Naturalistic principles/ Naturalistic principles are not informed by concepts of G-O-D, and more importantly, neither do Naturalistic principles presuppose the existence of G-O-D= but theism always presupposes the existence (authority) of Naturalistic principles as a necessity, in order to predicate on the prospects, attributes of G-O-D [the more you attack reason and logic the more you undermine your own predication of God!]

However, being open to the conversation means being open to the possibility of what is being said (one can indeed be wrong). If you dear sir, think you can justify theism, without the aid of fallacy, by all means make your case, but at present, you have merely complained, that you don't like the conclusion [you have repudiated the argument you have not refuted the argument]. This means nothing. In the future I suggest a refutation.  



II.

My dear Sir,

Did I not refute your claim?
 

Atheist: "A bright moral line between theists and non-theists might make you feel good, but you haven't indicated its location."

More than indication: one introduces the term G-O-D (which is empty until proven substantive).

Is this not a bright (I'm not so sure about your use of the word moral) line between theists and non-theists? Is this not the essence; the essential ingredient of theistic ontology itself? Is this not a separative indication?

Atheist: "being generally wrong because you believe they have committed a fallacy..."

Well, generally speaking, when someone commits a fallacy they are generally wrong, wouldn't you agree? Surely you would not argue that they are "generally right" because they have committed a fallacy?

[...further clarification: yes, I do believe theism commits a fallacy (that it MUST commit a fallacy), in contrast, you don't believe theism commits a fallacy in the process of seeking justification?]

Atheist: "I don't see where you have made an argument or been particularly "thoughtful"."

Is it possible that your subjectivity fails to see what is thoughtful? Can I be thoughtful even if you don't see it? Does the fact that Midas never saw the moon mean the moon is not there?

Atheist: "Do you not recognize that you are changing the subject by asking me to justify theism?"

Correction Sir, I am asking you to stand behind your insinuation that theism can be justified without a fallacy; that in making the opposite claim I have done something wrong (you took it upon yourself to challenge my view in favor of the rational-purity of theism).

Atheist: "...you accuse theists of being fallaciously closed to the arguments against theism..."

I made no such accusation. Where did I do this? I argued that the ontology of theism condemns it to a justification of fallacy.

Atheist: "...you match theists' presumed ad hominem against atheists with one of your own against theists."

"Presumed ad hominem?" You don't believe this is the case (which is really only one fallacy among a multitude of fallacies), why not?

Ad Hominem--- you mean pointing out THE FACT that theism has no other option but to rely on fallacy for a means of justification? I suppose I'm guilty as charged. But the assertion that this is an illegitimate point to make against theism is for you to prove.

Atheist: "It might ultimately be pointless, but why go out of your way to make it less likely by pushing another stereotype?" ---this is for you to prove.

 
My subject was "the ontology of theism." The argument is that theism, for what it is (the very essence of its being) requires a fallacy in the case of rational justification. You are free to disagree, but by all means, please provide an example of theistic justification in which there is no need for fallacy. I personally know of no such case.

As a Naturalist I am not ontologically committed to a position of justification by way of fallacy (and the real beauty is that I don't have to be)! If you think theism and atheism are on equal ontological grounds, then please make your case. There is something disingenuous and haughty about your reply--- clearly you do not embrace theism? Surely you know there is no such thing as a rationally justified theism (or else I presume you would be a theist)? So what is your problem with my position?

IN DEFENSE OF THEISM?

Atheist: "I read nothing more than you accusing theists of being generally wrong because you believe they have committed a fallacy (the fallacy of poisoning the well)..." [this sounds like the complaint of a zealous theistic apologist.]

And you don't believe theism commits this fallacy among other fallacies? Does this premise really require detailed justification (most specifically in light of your own presuppositions!)?

You are most certainly correct Sir, I have indeed "accused theists" of being committed to justification by way of fallacy. If you think they are not, or any theist for that matter thinks they can prove the existence of G-O-D, without the aid of fallacy, I am positively open to the conversation. You act as if this premise requires justification beyond the claims of theism itself--- as if I must open the volumes of Swinburne and Plantinga to make my case. Rubbish!

Do you think there is such a thing as a rationally justified theism? Has there ever been such a thing? If you say no, then clearly you must agree with me regarding the ontology of theism (that it must be committed to fallacy)? [which thing is true because it must always be committed to God--- hence, the ontology of theism!]

I am tired of my fellow man being slandered and abused in the name of God by the dictates of empty theistic piety. Theism is a specific thing, which commits it to a specific mode of justification. A puny child could never overpower a well developed man without stepping outside the context of physical strength (in the case of logic and theism this means fallacy, which is simply a matter of the ontology of the thing in question).

So does theism have an ontology, if so, is it rational or irrational? Have you ever thought of theism in terms of ontology?

I'm afraid I must resign beyond this point. And just to show you what kind of man I am, it is very possible that I have "overlooked" one of your complaints, or that I am, at some point, guilty of a fallacy, but nothing so serious as to refute my position regarding the ontology of theism--- for my position against theism is not contingent on my ability to argue, but on the nature of theism itself!

'Case and point: the ontology of theism guarantees the existence and necessity of fallacy in the face of reason. To be a theist is to be committed to an epistemology of justification on the basis of fallacy.'

respectfully yours,

Jersey Flight

Thursday, June 6, 2013

DECLARATION OF INTELLECTUAL WAR ON THEISM- Jersey Flight

We wage war on the theological instinct; on the theological conception of life. Our aim must be the land beyond theology, the place no longer conditioned and informed by theology; our aim must be the unification of a world free from theology (for theology is the enemy of man in that theology is the enemy of life). We must chase the old spiders from their caves, we must draw them into the scientific and rational light, it is high time to expose the faulty reign of intellectual theism (as though theism were not the very opposite of all that is intellectual)! And let this line ring true: if a man will be wise he must not be a theologian!

As for those who would dismiss us as freerange radicals; is not every rooster that flies free from the hallowed den considered a radical? Is the den truly the best place to be when it is the feeding fortress of wolves? We are those who would no longer be cheated; we are those who will reclaim our children from the long line of destructive superstition (as though tradition were true by default of being tradition).  

We wage the most righteous and holy of all wars: the intellectual war for freedom; a war against the great ideological and psychological oppressor of mankind; against the despisers and destroyers of beauty; against those who constrain the earth’s most valued creators... 

We wage war against the ancient demon that men have called a God!  

[One must understand our rhetoric: that this is only the foundation; the very beginning of our axiom (for we have not yet begun to fight). What comes next is the contextual shattering of the great image! Let the faithful come forth; let them declare their holy teachers; let them proclaim the power of their masters; let them march behind their champions as behind invincible titans (arguments perceived as impenetrable stone)--- for we have no desire to fight neophytes! Bring forth your best! Bring forth your scholars; call your strongmen down from the mountain and they will be met on the field of battle... and as the dust flies from the earth so shall the theologian return from whence he came!]  

We demand your very best, so that once we have defeated, shattered your adamantine protectors, you cannot cry out--- “straw-man, straw-man!”